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BOOK REVIEWS
Reference, to be sure, is made to pages in Volumes 44 and 45 of the Congres-
sional Record for Congressional Discussion on the Amendment. In the light
of what might be considered a tortured interpretation of the words, "from
whatever source derived" by the Supreme Court in Brushaber v. Union Pacific
R. R. (240 U. S. 1) and other cases, and the mischief that has resulted from
such interpretation, selective references to the Congressional Discussion might
have been included, verbatim, and these would have been quite enlightening.
This volume belongs in any tax library and the author merits the gratitude
of tax practitioners for simplifying a monumental task of investigation of any
tax problem.
BENJAMIN HARROW.*
NEo-NEUTAI.TIv. By Georg Cohn. Translated from the Danish by Arthur
S. Keller. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, pp. x, 388.
Dr. Cohn, Chairman of the International Law Division of the Danish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, offers here an unusually stimulating and challeng-
ing critique of traditional concepts of neutrality. That such a volume as this
is a timely contribution to an age-old problem, become again acute, needs no
emphasis. 'What makes it particularly important is its refreshing independence
of viewpoint and its sharp analysis of doctrines both old and new.
The author devotes over two-thirds of his study to a searching appraisal of
the legal background. He reviews, historically and analytically, the traditional
concepts of neutrality, the technical problem of organizing the relations of
belligerents and neutrals, and the relations between the idea of aggression (and
the classification of war in general) and neutrality. He points out how, during
the long evolution of the theory and practice of neutrality, certain concepts
became so widely recognized that a "law" of neutrality was, in the nineteenth
century, on the way toward general recognition. But he points out how most
of these concepts were of an essentially negative character. On the one hand,
the status of neutrality depended in the last analysis on the will of the belliger-
ents. What privileges were enjoyed by neutrals were concessions granted by
the states at war, not assertions of right substantiated by the action of the
neutrals themselves. Only in the Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800 was
there any concerted attempt on the part of neutrals to vindicate their determi-
nation to stay out of war. On the other, Dr. Cohn shows how far the "law"
was a function, indeed a product, of changing conditions of trade and transport
during the past three or four centuries. The expansion of commerce, the shift
from sail to steam, the new technology of war which utilized an increasing
range of products, all contributed to sharpening the divergence of interest and
reflected in the constant attrition of neutral "rights". The whole process culmi-
nated in the War of 1914 when what had been thought of as reasonably stable
rules of mutual conduct were ground out in the hopper of military necessity.
After 1919, new theories seemed at first to offer a substitute for traditional
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
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concepts of neutrality. The Covenant of the League of Nations and other
treaties seemed to afford the basis for discarding the concept altogether in favor
of international action to keep the universal peace. Conflicting ideas were,
however, not fundamentally resolved. The prescriptions of the Kellogg Pact
proved illusory in their practical operation. The principles of the Geneva
Protocol, based on the definition of aggression, failed to provide a workable
basis for genuine international cooperation to suppress war. Nor have later
formulas for defining aggression and implementing the machinery for joint
action against aggressors stood the test of a persistent will to expansion by
strong states at the expense of the weak.
The logic of events has, therefore, demonstrated the importance of review-
ig the inherent legal and practical difficulties in avoiding war. A general
international interest in law and order has not yet become sufficiently widespread
to justify the idea that states will not be confronted by the necessity of protect-
ing by their own action non-participation in war. And, since war is an economic
and social as well as psychological dislocation of the true purposes of the State,
there is a real interest in avoiding it. Traditional neutrality offers no guar-
antee; what is needed is a positive policy designed to insure, as far as possible,
non-involvement for those States not directly participating.
Such a'policy Dr. Cohn outlines in his analysis of "Neo-Neutrality". It is
based on a rejection of the 19th century doctrine of strict impartiality on the
part of neutrals. He points out that Grotius and his immediate successors
distinguished between just and unjust wars as a basis for determining neutral
attitude and action. Dr. Cohn would hold all wars unjust. Hence neutrals
have no obligation toward either belligerent; they must act concertedly to pre-
vent the spread of the war. Economic sanctions, cooperatively undertaken, are
one means at their command. Whatever steps will lead to the quickest possible
cessation of hostilities is in the interest of the neutrals and justifies whatever
partiality may hasten that objective. "The system of war-prevention should be
a development of the neutrality policies of the countries at peace, not of the
war policies of the great military powers."
This theory suggests, although the author does not analyze the question in
detail, that economic discrimination is an effective means of neutral action.
That question confronts this country at the moment-not, however, from the
point of view which Dr. Cohn elaborates. For prospective discriminatory action
is all too patently based on the profit motive. And it is, furthermore, a purely
unilateral action. The United States has a unique opportunity-and a real
responsibility, in terms of ending the menace of war, to present-day society-to
lead in the formation of a real League of Neutrals. Such a league, designed
not only to avoid involvement but to stop war, might well prove the most
effective instrument for ending the continuous and increasing hazard to the
progressive attainment of the conditions of a lasting peace. There is a real
interest on our own part in a settled world. That interest needs assertion and
vindication today even more clearly than in 1914. Neither profits nor propin-
quity of feeling affords an excuse for abandoning it. If discrimination is to be
practiced, there is only one ground, in morals and so in law, on which it can
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be justified. Dr. Cohn has stated that justification, with forthright vigor and
an appraisal of the alternatives as unequivocal as it is incisive.
PHILLIPS BRADLEY.*
DEFENDING AND PROSECUTING FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES. By Theodore W.
Housel and Guy 0. Walser. Buffalo: Dennis & Co., Inc., 1938, pp. xciv,
1213.
The authors set out to combine into one undertaking the principles and
details of federal criminal substantive and adjective law. They then supple-
mented this combination by annexing to the various sections of the volume
suggestions which are in effect '.practical aids" to lawyers in the field of federal
criminal law. In view of the task's magnitude, the scope of which might well
encompass several volumes with annual supplements, it is surprising to see the
degree of success achieved by the authors.
The volume begins with a somewhat discordant note in the form of an
introduction which includes, in part, the general subject of judicial obligations
in the enforcement of criminal law. The authors then properly and capably
proceed to the topics of jurisdiction, criminal responsibility, prosecutive agencies
and the federal courts system.
The book contains an excellent dissertation on the physical requirements of
the form and substance of an indictment and a somewhat smaller review of
prosecution by information. It must be noted that the latter form of prosecu-
tive procedure is increasing in importance in view of the enlarged area of
conduct regulated by criminal law.1
A rather unusual appendage to a law text may be found in two interesting
chapters, "United States Attorney's Preparation for Trial" and "Defendant's
Preparation for Trial". The utility of such chapters cannot be over-emphasized
for they contain the practical hints of the authors' experiences. It is interesting
to view the approach recommended by the authors in the preparation of a
defense in a criminal case. "Experience indicates that it is useless to pose the
categorical question to the defendant as to whether he is guilty or not," state
Housel and Walser. "Defendant's counsel will for the practical purposes of
trial preparation assume the technical guilt of the defendant and prepare
accordingly." 2
In short, within the confines of one cover may be found a close review of
federal criminal procedure from the moment a prosecution is initiated till such
time as twelve persons who are strangers to each other agree on something so
controversial as the liberty of a person. In addition, the volume contains an
adequate explanation of appeals, writs of certiorari, and those alliterative hopes
of every prisoner at the federal dock, pardon, probation and parole. An ade-
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